Case law Brussels I Regulation (44/2001)

General rules for the application of the Brussels I Regulation

ECJ 1 March 2005 ‘Owusu v Jackson c.s.’ (Case C-281/02, ECR 2005 Page I-01383)

1. Article 2 of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Article 2 of the Brussels I Regulation] is applicable in proceedings where the parties before the courts of a Contracting State [Member State] are domiciled in that State and the litigation between them has certain connections with a third State but not with another Contracting State [Member State] , that provision thus covering relationships between the courts of a single Contracting State [Member State] and those of a non-Contracting State [non-Member State], rather than relationships between the courts of several Contracting States [Member States].

Although, for the jurisdiction rules of the Convention [Regulation] to apply at all, the existence of an international element is required, the international nature of the legal relationship at issue need not necessarily derive, for the purposes of the application of that provision, from the involvement, either because of the subject-matter of the proceedings or the respective domiciles of the parties, of a number of Contracting States [Member States]. The involvement of a Contracting State [Member State] and a non-Contracting State [non-Member State], for example because the claimant and one defendant are domiciled in the first State and the events at issue occurred in the second, would also make the legal relationship at issue international in nature.

Moreover, the designation of the court of a Contracting State [Member State] as the court having jurisdiction on the ground of the defendant’s domicile in that State, even in proceedings which are, at least in part, connected, because of their subject-matter or the claimant’s domicile, with a non-Contracting State [non-Membre-State], is not such as to impose an obligation on that State so that the principle of the relative effect of treaties is not affected (see paras 25-26, 30-31, 35).

2. The Convention [Regulation] precludes a court of a Contracting State [Member State] from declining to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court in a non-Contracting State [non-Member State] would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State [Member State] is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State [Member State].

No exception on the basis of the forum non conveniens doctrine was provided for by the authors of the Convention [Regulation] and application of the doctrine is liable to undermine the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Convention [Regulation], and consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which is the basis of the Convention [Regulation]. Moreover, allowing forum non conveniens would be likely to affect the uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained in the Convention [Regulation] and the legal protection of persons established in the Community (see paras 37, 41-43, operative part).

ECJ 10 June 2004 ‘Warbecq v Ryanair’ (Case C-555/03, ECR 2004 p. I-06041)

Under Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognisance of an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible, the Court may, by reasoned order, after hearing the Advocate General and without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action.

Article 68(1) EC provides that ‘Article 234 shall apply to this Title [IV concerning “Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons”] under the following circumstances and conditions: where a question on the interpretation … of acts of the institutions of the Community based on this Title is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a ruling thereon’.

The Brussels I Regulation (No 44/2001) was adopted on the basis of Article 61(c) EC, which appears in Part Three, Title IV of the EC Treaty. In those circumstances, only a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law may request the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of that regulation.

It is not disputed in the present case that decisions taken by the Tribunal du travail de Charleroi in proceedings such as the main proceedings are amenable to appeal under national law. Therefore, as the reference to the Court has not been made by a court or tribunal as referred to in Article 68 EC, the Court has no jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Regulation No 44/2001.

ECJ 27 April 2004 ‘Turner v Changepoint’ (Case C-159/02, ECR 2004 Page I-03565)

The Convention of 27 September 1968 [the Brussels I Regulation] is to be interpreted as precluding the grant of an injunction whereby a court of a Contracting State prohibits a party to proceedings pending before it from commencing or continuing legal proceedings before a court of another Contracting State, even where that party is acting in bad faith with a view to frustrating the existing proceedings.

ECJ 8 May 2003 ‘Gantner v Basch’ (Case C-111/01, ECR 2003 p. I-04207)

In the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and the national courts established by the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the 1968 Brussels Convention [ the Brussels I Regulation], in exceptional circumstances the Court can examine the conditions in which a case has been referred to it by the national court, in order to assess whether it has jurisdiction. The spirit of cooperation which must prevail in the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the national court, for its part, to have regard to the function entrusted to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions on general or hypothetical questions. In order to enable the Court to provide a useful interpretation of Community law, it is essential for the national court to explain why it considers that a reply to its questions is necessary to enable it to give judgment. A question referred for a preliminary ruling is therefore inadmissible if it does not provide the Court with sufficient information to indicate how an answer to that question is necessary (see paras 34-35, 37-38, 40-41)

ECJ 22 March 2002 ‘Marseille Fret v Seatrano Shipping’ (Case C-24/02, ECR 2002 p. I-03383)

Under Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure, where it is clear that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognisance of an action or where the action is manifestly inadmissible, the Court may, after hearing the Advocate General and without taking further steps in the proceedings, give a decision on the action by reasoned order.

It must be observed at the outset that the four questions referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling, although worded differently, have the same subject-matter. By those questions the national court seeks to ascertain, essentially, the likely effects of an anti-suit injunction issued by the High Court of Justice under the Brussels 1968 Convention and the Brussels I Regulation No 44/2001, in the context of the proceedings before it.

The jurisdiction of the Court to interpret the 1968 Brussels Convention is established by the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention (OJ 1975 L 304, p. 50), as amended by the Accession Conventions (the Protocol). Unlike Article 234 EC, which is not applicable, the Protocol reserves to certain courts, referred to in Article 2 of the Protocol, the power to request the Court of Justice to give preliminary rulings on questions of interpretation of the 1968 Brussels Convention, so that it is appropriate, in that regard, to examine whether the Court has jurisdiction to answer the questions which have been referred.

Article 2(1) and (3) of that Protocol set out expressly and exhaustively - the first directly, the second by reference to Article 37 of the 1968 Brussels Convention - the courts which may make references to the Court. Article 2(2) of the Protocol adds that the courts of the Contracting States sitting in an appellate capacity may also do so.

French Tribunaux de commerce are not mentioned in Article 2(1) of the Protocol or in Article 37 of the 1968 Brussels Convention. Furthermore, according to the file on the case in the main proceedings, the judgment referring questions to the Court was given in proceedings at first instance. It follows that, in the main proceedings, the Tribunal de commerce de Marseille may not request the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Convention.

As regards the Brussels I Regulation (No 44/2001), it is sufficient to observe that it only entered into force on 1 March 2002, after the judgment referring questions to the Court was delivered. In addition, since the Regulation was adopted on the basis of Article 61(c) EC, it follows from Article 68(1) EC that only a court or a tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, has jurisdiction to request the Court to give a preliminary ruling on its interpretation. n those circumstances Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure must be applied, and it must be held that the Court clearly has no jurisdiction to rule on the questions put by the Tribunal de commerce de Marseille.

ECJ 22 March 2002 ‘Reichling v Wampach’ (Case C-69/02, ECR 2002 Page I-03393)

Article 2(1) and (3) of the Protocol set out expressly and exhaustively - the first directly, the second by reference to Article 37 of the Convention - the courts which may make references to the Court. Article 2(2) adds that the courts of the Contracting States sitting in an appellate capacity may also do so.

Luxembourg Tribunaux de paix are not mentioned either in Article 2(1) of the Protocol or in Article 37 of the Convention [Article 43 and 44 Brussels I Regulation]. Furthermore, it is clear from Article 2 of the new Luxembourg Civil Procedure Code in conjunction with Article 9 of the Luxembourg Law of 11 November 1970 on assignment and attachment of salaries, pensions and investment income that, when the Tribunal de paix rules on the validity of an attachment order for a sum exceeding the limit of its jurisdiction of last resort, its decision is subject to appeal. In the present case, it follows both from the subject-matter of the main proceedings, as set out by the national court, and from further details in that regard given by the judgment referring questions to the Court, that the Tribunal de paix is sitting as a court of first instance.

It follows that, in the main proceedings, the Tribunal de paix de Luxembourg may not request the Court to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the Convention.

In those circumstances, Article 92(1) of the Rules of Procedure must be applied and it must be held that the Court clearly has no jurisdiction to rule on the questions put by the Tribunal de paix de Luxembourg.

ECJ 16 March 1999 ‘Castelletti v Trumpy’ (Case C-159/97, ECR 1999 p. I-01597)

Under the division of responsibilities in the preliminary ruling procedure laid down by the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it submits to the Court.

ECJ 10 February 1994 'Mund r v Hatrex' (Case C-398/92 ECR 1994 Page I-00467, (para 11-12))

By providing that the Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts and tribunals, the purpose of the fourth indent of Article 220 of the Treaty is to facilitate the working of the common market through the adoption of rules of jurisdiction for disputes relating thereto and the elimination, as far as is possible, of diffculties concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the territory of the Contracting States. It follows that the provisions of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, concluded on the basis of that article and within the framework defined by it, and also the national provisions to which the Convention refers, are linked to the EEC Treaty.

ECJ 13 July 1993 'Mulox v Hendrick Geels' (Case C-125/92 (para 10-11)

The terms used in the 1968 Brussels Convention [Brussels I Regulation] on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters must be interpreted autonomously. Only such an interpretation is capable of ensuring uniform application of the Convention, the objectives of which include unification of the rules on jurisdiction of the Contracting States, so as to avoid as far as possible the multiplication of the bases of jurisdiction in relation to one and the same legal relationship and to reinforce the legal protection available to persons established in the Community by, at the same time, allowing the plaintiff easily to identify the court before which he may bring an action and the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he may be sued.

ECJ 15 November 1983 'Duijnstee v Goderbauer' (Case 288/82)

The 1968 Brussels Convention [Brussels I Regulation], which seeks to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States [Member States] in civil matters, must override national provisions which are incompatible with it.

ECJ 21 May 1980 'Denilauler v Couchet' (Case 125/79)

As the Brussels Convention [Brussels I Regulation] seeks to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States [Member States] in the intra-community legal order in regard to matters of civil jurisdiction, the national procedural laws applicable to the cases concerned are set aside in the matters governed by the Convention [Regulation] in favour of the provisions thereof.

ECJ 13 November 1979 'Sanicentral v. Collinin' (Case 25/79 (1979) ECR 3423-3431)

In matters governed by the 1968 Brussels Convention [Brussels I Regulation] national procedural laws are set aside by the provisions of the Convention.

ECJ 22 November 1978 'Somafer v Saar-Ferngas' (Case 33/78)

The 1968 Brussels Convention [Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted having regard both to its principles and objectives and to its relationship with the Treaty. The question whether the words and concepts used in the convention must be regarded as having their own independent meaning and as being thus common to all the contracting states or as referring to substantive rules of the law applicable in each case under the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is first brought must be so answered as to ensure that the convention is fully effective in achieving the objects which it pursues.

ECJ 14 July 1977 'Bavaria v Eurocontrol' (Joined Cases 9 and 10-77)

The principle of legal certainty in the community legal system and the objectives of the 1968 Brussels Convention [Brussels I Regulation] in accordance with article 220 of the EEC Treaty, which is at its origin, require in all Member States a uniform application of the legal concepts and legal classifications developed by the court in the context of the Brussels Convention.

ECJ 6 October 1976 'Tessili Italiana v Dunlop' (Case 12-76)

The 1968 Brussels Convention [Brussels I Regulation] must be interpreted having regard both to its principles and objectives and to its relationship with the Treaty. As regards the question whether the words and concepts used in the Convention [Regulation] must be regarded as having their own independent meaning and as being thus common to all the Member States or as referring to substantive rules of the law applicable in each case under the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is first brought, the appropriate choice can only be made in respect of each of the provisions of the Convention [Regulation] to ensure that it is fully effective having regard to the objectives of article 220 of the Treaty.