Case Law 1968 Brussels
Convention
General rules for the application of
the 1968 Brussels Convention
ECJ
27 April 2004 ‘Turner v Changepoint’ (Case
C-159/02, ECR 2004 Page I-03565)
The Convention of 27 September 1968 is to be interpreted
as precluding the grant of an injunction whereby a court of a Contracting
State prohibits a party to proceedings pending before it from commencing
or continuing legal proceedings before a court of another Contracting
State, even where that party is acting in bad faith with a view to
frustrating the existing proceedings.
ECJ
8 May 2003 ‘Gantner v Basch’ (Case C-111/01,
ECR 2003 p. I-04207)
In the context of the cooperation between the Court of Justice and
the national courts established by the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on
the interpretation by the Court of Justice of the 1968 Brussels Convention,
in exceptional circumstances the Court can examine the conditions
in which a case has been referred to it by the national court, in
order to assess whether it has jurisdiction. The spirit of cooperation
which must prevail in the preliminary-ruling procedure requires the
national court, for its part, to have regard to the function entrusted
to the Court of Justice, which is to assist in the administration
of justice in the Member States and not to deliver advisory opinions
on general or hypothetical questions. In order to enable the Court
to provide a useful interpretation of Community law, it is essential
for the national court to explain why it considers that a reply to
its questions is necessary to enable it to give judgment. A question
referred for a preliminary ruling is therefore inadmissible if it
does not provide the Court with sufficient information to indicate
how an answer to that question is necessary (see paras 34-35, 37-38,
40-41)
ECJ
22 March 2002 ‘Reichling v Wampach’ (Case
C-69/02, ECR 2002 Page I-03393)
Article 2(1) and (3) of the Protocol set
out expressly and exhaustively - the first directly, the second by
reference to Article 37 of the Convention - the courts which may make
references to the Court. Article 2(2) adds that the courts of the
Contracting States sitting in an appellate capacity may also do so.
Luxembourg Tribunaux de paix are not mentioned either
in Article 2(1) of the Protocol or in Article 37 of the Convention.
Furthermore, it is clear from Article 2 of the new Luxembourg Civil
Procedure Code in conjunction with Article 9 of the Luxembourg Law
of 11 November 1970 on assignment and attachment of salaries, pensions
and investment income that, when the Tribunal de paix rules on the
validity of an attachment order for a sum exceeding the limit of its
jurisdiction of last resort, its decision is subject to appeal. In
the present case, it follows both from the subject-matter of the main
proceedings, as set out by the national court, and from further details
in that regard given by the judgment referring questions to the Court,
that the Tribunal de paix is sitting as a court of first instance.
It follows that, in the main proceedings, the Tribunal
de paix de Luxembourg may not request the Court to give a preliminary
ruling on the interpretation of the Convention.
In those circumstances, Article 92(1) of the Rules
of Procedure must be applied and it must be held that the Court clearly
has no jurisdiction to rule on the questions put by the Tribunal de
paix de Luxembourg.
ECJ
16 March 1999 ‘Castelletti v Trumpy’ (Case
C-159/97, ECR 1999 p. I-01597)
Under the division of responsibilities in the preliminary
ruling procedure laid down by the Protocol of 3 June 1971 on the interpretation
by the Court of Justice of the Convention of 27 September 1968 on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, it is solely for the national court before which the dispute
has been brought, and which must assume responsibility for the subsequent
judicial decision, to determine in the light of the particular circumstances
of each case both the need for a preliminary ruling in order to enable
it to deliver judgment and the relevance of the questions which it
submits to the Court.
ECJ
10 February 1994 'Mund r v Hatrex' (Case C-398/92
ECR 1994 Page I-00467, (para 11-12))
By providing that the Member States shall, so far
as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other with a view
to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals the simplification
of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement
of judgments of courts and tribunals, the purpose of the fourth indent
of Article 220 of the Treaty is to facilitate the working of the common
market through the adoption of rules of jurisdiction for disputes
relating thereto and the elimination, as far as is possible, of diffculties
concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the territory
of the Contracting States. It follows that the provisions of the Brussels
Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, concluded on the basis
of that article and within the framework defined by it, and also the
national provisions to which the Convention refers, are linked to
the EEC Treaty.
ECJ
13 July 1993 'Mulox v Hendrick Geels' (Case C-125/92
(para 10-11)
The terms used in the Convention of 27 September
1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters must be interpreted autonomously. Only such an
interpretation is capable of ensuring uniform application of the Convention,
the objectives of which include unification of the rules on jurisdiction
of the Contracting States, so as to avoid as far as possible the multiplication
of the bases of jurisdiction in relation to one and the same legal
relationship and to reinforce the legal protection available to persons
established in the Community by, at the same time, allowing the plaintiff
easily to identify the court before which he may bring an action and
the defendant reasonably to foresee the court before which he may
be sued.
ECJ
15 November 1983 'Duijnstee v Goderbauer' (Case 288/82)
The Convention of 27 September 1968, which seeks
to determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States
in civil matters, must override national provisions which are incompatible
with it.
ECJ
21 May 1980 'Denilauler v Couchet' (Case 125/79)
As the Brussels Convention seeks to determine the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Contracting States in the intra-community
legal order in regard to matters of civil jurisdiction, the national
procedural laws applicable to the cases concerned are set aside in
the matters governed by the Convention in favour of the provisions
thereof.
ECJ
13 November 1979 'Sanicentral v. Collinin' (Case 25/79
(1979) ECR 3423-3431)
In matters governed by the Convention national procedural
laws are set aside by the provisions of the Convention.
ECJ
22 November 1978 'Somafer v Saar-Ferngas' (Case 33/78)
The convention of 27 september 1968 must be interpreted
having regard both to its principles and objectives and to its relationship
with the treaty. The question whether the words and concepts used
in the convention must be regarded as having their own independent
meaning and as being thus common to all the contracting states or
as referring to substantive rules of the law applicable in each case
under the rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the
matter is first brought must be so answered as to ensure that the
convention is fully effective in achieving the objects which it pursues.
ECJ
14 July 1977 'Bavaria v Eurocontrol' (Joined Cases
9 and 10-77)
The principle of legal certainty in the community
legal system and the objectives of the Brussels Convention in accordance
with article 220 of the EEC Treaty, which is at its origin, require
in all Member States a uniform application of the legal concepts and
legal classifications developed by the court in the context of the
Brussels Convention.
ECJ
6 October 1976 'Tessili Italiana v Dunlop' (Case 12-76)
The Convention of 27 september 1968 must be interpreted
having regard both to its principles and objectives and to its relationship
with the Treaty . As regards the question whether the words and concepts
used in the Convention must be regarded as having their own independent
meaning and as being thus common to all the Member States or as referring
to substantive rules of the law applicable in each case under the
rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is
first brought, the appropriate choice can only be made in respect
of each of the provisions of the Convention to ensure that it is fully
effective having regard to the objectives of article 220 of the Treaty.
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